Towards Creating a Thin Client for Monero by Lee, Kevin
c© 2017 Kevin Lee
TOWARDS CREATING A THIN CLIENT FOR MONERO
BY
KEVIN LEE
THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Bachelor of Science in Electrical and Computer Engineering
in the College of Engineering of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2017
Urbana, Illinois
Adviser:
Professor Andrew Miller
ABSTRACT
As an increasing number of users begin to use cryptocurrencies, the number
of transactions per day has also been steadily increasing. Users traditionally
run full nodes which involve downloading a copy of the blockchain associ-
ated with that cryptocurrency and updating it through the network. This
method guarantees full security at the cost of greater power consumption
and data storage. The recent ubiquity of data connections and low-capacity
hardware such as smartphones has only furthered the demand to delegate
cryptocurrency-related computations to capable servers. This raises the need
to verify results that are returned to a light client by a server, and also to
perform conflict resolutions whenever servers disagree upon a query. In this
study, we implement the storage of the Monero blockchain as authenticated
data structures on powerful servers, and perform computations on the data
structures as queries are made or as the blockchain is updated. Experimental
results have shown that authenticated data structures can be used to create
a secure thin client for Monero, and we conclude with a discussion on the
possibility of integrating that thin client into the network.
Keywords: Cloud Computing; Verifiable Computation; Security; Cryp-
tocurrency
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, cryptocurrencies have gained worldwide attention for
their use of cryptography to make secure transactions and verify transfers of
assets between users. With the start of Bitcoin [1] in 2008, these systems
provide public logs that are available to everyone. These logs, or blockchains,
are immutable and large (the Bitcoin blockchain is 160 GB as of November
2017), and blocks containing new transactions are constantly being added.
With the simultaneous rise of Cloud Computing, more users are foregoing
the costs of running a full node, a program that downloads all block and
verifies them, instead delegating the storage and all relevant computations
associated with the blockchains to powerful servers.
However, this strategy of outsourcing computations comes at the cost of
full security. There are many reasons for a cloud to answer a request in-
correctly. For instance, a cloud might benefit from particular outputs of a
computation, and thus would be incentivized to maximize those results [2].
A client with just the result would usually not be able to differentiate be-
tween correct and incorrect information. To mitigate this, thin clients can
employ authenticated data structures [3], [4] at the server side in order for
the client to verify that a query was correctly returned. Whenever a server
fetches data from the blockchain, it will additionally return a compact proof
that can be efficiently performed by the less powerful client to check whether
the data returned was valid, and furthermore whether the server is honest.
Merkle hash trees [5] are the earliest known examples of authenticated
data structures (ADS). By associating each value in an array of data with its
hash, the cryptographically hashed data, or digests, serve as leaf nodes in a
binary tree that is formed by recursively hashing the concatenation of digests
of its siblings until there is a single node left. This top node, the Merkle root,
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is stored at the client and acts as a value to be checked against whenever
a proof is returned by a server. When a value is looked up in the tree on
the server side, the digests involved in the path taken to reach the value are
packed into a compact proof that is sent to the client. The client can then
reconstruct the path taken by the server in the Merkle tree, and accept the
data returned if the proof ends up with the same value of the Merkle root it
has stored. For N values, the server would only need to include logN digests
in its proof, and the client would only need to take logN steps to verify a
response. A visualization of our method is given in 1.1.
Figure 1.1: To prove the node in green was correctly fetched, a server would
provide the hashes of the nodes in purple in ascending order as a proof.
There are currently several thin clients that Bitcoin users can use to re-
trieve account balances and send transactions without downloading the whole
blockchain. One such client is Electrum [6], that maintains its own servers
that run Bitcoin nodes. Electrum fetches information from the servers and
lets clients get their balances and check transactions by using Simple Pay-
ment Verification, which involves downloading only the block headers and
filtering for relevant transactions. Electrum servers use SSL authentication
to protect users from man-in-the-middle attacks, but has no robust mecha-
nism to protect users from dishonest servers.
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Presently, there is no well-known thin client implementation for any cryp-
tocurrency that uses authenticated data structures to provide security to its
users. There have been many previous studies [4], [7] on the feasibility of
using ADS in a thin client for Bitcoin, but none of them have been widely
implemented yet.
This study presents a method for computing an authenticated data struc-
ture over the current Monero [8] blockchain. Monero, a CryptoNote-based
digital currency that aims at providing privacy in its transactions by using
chaff coins called mixins, along with the actual coins that are spent, requires
constant sampling of these mixins from the blockchain. A client would need
to make multiple calls to a server running a Monero full node when it asks
for the chaff coins to use in its transactions. This introduces many opportu-
nities for a server to answer incorrectly to a query, and a single invalid mixin
would invalidate the transaction. Due to this, it is imperative for a client to
be guaranteed correctness of a successful query as well as the ability to find
honest servers while eliminating dishonest ones.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Cryptocurrencies
A cryptocurrency is a decentralized peer-to-peer network that uses a public
distributed ledger, called a blockchain, to keep track of user account balances.
To spend cryptocurrencies, users broadcast digitally signed messages to the
network, which validate the messages and append them to the ledger as
transactions. Each cryptocurrency transaction contains inputs and outputs,
where the inputs are funds that the sender owns and the outputs are amounts
transferred to another user in the network or back to the wallet of the sender.
In essence, each outgoing transaction is a reference to an earlier incoming
transaction to the senders account. Because the blockchain is an append-
only data structure with each new block including the hash of the previous
block, transactions cannot be modified once they have been confirmed.
2.1.1 Monero
Because a blockchain is public, users can potentially be at risk of privacy
attacks long after they have committed transactions. Transactions can be
easily linked by data miners and may even expose identifying information
about the users who were involved. Monero, a CryptoNote-based cryptocur-
rency, aims at obscuring transactions in order to remedy this.
When a user creates a transaction in Monero, he specifies the number of
mixins, or chaff coins, to be included in the transactions. These mixins are
actually valid outputs that were generated in previous spends by other users
in the network, and added to the anonymity set. The wallet protocol will
sample outputs that originate from earlier transactions to be included as fake
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spends, as well as the user’s own coin to be spent. The mixins are sampled
based on their age and then sorted in increasing order along with the real
coin. This makes it impossible for anyone to tell which coin is the real spend,
and renders transactions effectively unlinkable.
Figure 2.1: A transaction with 3 mixins. The output with index 3 is the
real spend, while outputs 1, 5, and 6 are selected as chaff
Transactions also generate new outputs that are added to the blockchain.
These outputs are assigned a unique 64-character public key identifier and
a global index integer based on their denomination. For instance, if an out-
put of the denomination 10 XMR (10 units of Monero) is the fifth output
of that denomination in the blockchain, then it would have a global index of 5.
With the introduction of RingCT in January 10, 2017, denominations no
longer appear in the Monero blockchain. The new protocol masks amounts
to all those not involved in the transaction; peers would be able to see that
a transaction occurred, but would not be able to know the amount that was
sent. On popular block explorers, amounts usually show up as 0 XMR. Even
though RingCT outputs are required to be mixed with other outputs coming
from RingCT transactions, the anonymity set is now much larger because
outputs are no longer split up by denomination.
Though it may seem that one would not be able to tell which mixin is the
actual one being spent in a transaction, Monero’s sampling protocol has a few
weaknesses. We have previously done an empirical analysis [9] of traceabil-
ity in the Monero blockchain based on the different mixin-selection schemes
the protocol has employed, and were able to find a substantial amount of
transactions in the blockchain to be vulnerable. Our programs were able to
expose the real spent coins in transactions due to weaknesses in both sam-
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pling strategies and anonymity set. This issue is not the focus of this study,
however.
2.2 Delegation of Computation
There have been several previous works done in the subject of verifying com-
putations. Quin, a protocol developed for clients to verify the correctness
of a clouds computation, is a refereed delegation of computation, or RDoC,
system [2]. By splitting computations of servers in conflict into smaller parts,
the protocol can find dishonest servers in logarithmically bound rounds. The
conflict resolution protocol involves using a binary search to find the initial
point of disagreement between servers. Versum [10], a system that is based
on Quin, achieves low overhead in incremental computation and conflict res-
olution. It makes use of Seqhash, an ADS that allows servers to construct
digests of computation histories using incremental updates. While our sys-
tem supports incremental updates as new blocks are created in Monero, we
do not need to use an ADS like Seqhash to keep track of computation his-
tories, as we are only concerned about the correctness of the leaves of the
Merkle tree, which are transaction outputs.
2.2.1 TrueBit
A dispute resolution layer similar to that of Quin is implemented in Truebit
[11], which is built over the Ethereum [12] blockchain. TrueBit is a system
that efficiently processes and verifies transactions in Ethereum by reducing
the number of redundant network computations used in traditional smart
contracts. In TrueBit, the objective of the verification game is to resolve
a dispute between a server and a client. The judges in the network are all
the Ethereum miners in the network who reach verdicts through Nakamoto
consensus [1]. The client will challenge the server to provide its computation
over a requested time interval, and repeatedly challenge over a smaller subsets
with the previous subset until the judges can easily decide on whether the
challenge is justified. At the end of the game, either the server is found
to be cheating and penalized, or the client is penalized for the false alarm.
Our conflict resolution protocol also repeatedly makes calls over a subset of
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digests until it is trivial for the client to catch any dishonesty.
7
CHAPTER 3
SYSTEM DESIGN
3.1 Security Goals
The goal of our design is to provide a way for a thin client connected to a
server to verify that queries returned are correct. Without its own copy of
the blockchain, a client would need a proof-of-correctness to make sure that
the data received is indeed the one it requested. Merkle hash trees allow for
the verification of large data structures, notably blockchains.
When servers are in disagreement, the client also needs to be able to dis-
tinguish the honest server from the dishonest one. Querying each server for
every single output in order can take a long time, especially with network
delays, as well as space. An efficient conflict resolution protocol is needed for
this system.
3.2 Overview of Design
The design of our authenticated data structure over the Monero blockchain
involves utilizing nested Merkle hash trees. A tree is built over the outputs,
and then used as a leaf in the construction of the tree over the transactions,
and so on. The reason for doing this rather than building a single tree over
the outputs is mainly for the conflict resolution protocol, which is discussed
later. In the protocol, servers are asked at several stages to retrieve the num-
ber of leaves in their tree structures, which could correspond to the number
of blocks, transactions, or outputs present. Having a nested structure makes
it quicker for a server to respond to that query and avoid being timed out.
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The calculation is threefold: First, the outputs of a transaction are used to
compute a Merkle tree. The root of the resulting tree is used in the compu-
tation of another Merkle tree over the transactions that belong to the same
block. Lastly, a top Merkle tree is calculated over the current blocks in the
Monero blockchain. Because Monero transactions are constantly being made
and new blocks are added to the ledger, our implementation supports effi-
cient incorporation of the new information into the top Merkle tree structure
without entire recomputation. The authenticated data structures generated
are stored alongside the unmodified Monero blockchain on multiple servers.
Using standard queries, the client, in reasonable time, can get a result as well
as a proof to verify the result.
3.2.1 Retrieving Queries
From storing the top Merkle root of the server, the client now knows of the
number of outputs stored at the server, which is trusted to be running a full
node of the Monero blockchain and periodically updating. When the client
wants to send a transaction, it will query the server for the output at the
requested global index, sample the indices of the mixins to be included in
the transaction, and request the outputs from the server in the same fash-
ion. The query for the real spend should be randomly made between the
queries for the mixins so as to ward off any guessing attacks by listeners on
the connection. Now with all the outputs requested, the client can generate
the transaction using its wallet and commit the transaction to the Monero
network.
On the server side, when the request for an output from a client is received,
the server will first determine the validity of the query. If the requested index
is negative, greater than its maximum index, or cannot be parsed from the
request, then the server will return a failure message to the client. Otherwise,
the server will retrieve the output at the requested index. It does so by doing
a modified bisection search over the leaves of the top Merkle tree. Because
we design nodes to include the greatest global index they contain, our goal
is to find the node with the smallest index that is greater than or equal to
the requested index. At the end of the bisection search we are guaranteed to
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have the block in which the requested output resides.
Upon retrieving the correct leaf of the top Merkle tree, the fetch process
continues by running the modified bisection search again on the block Merkle
tree. Like the nodes of the top Merkle tree, the nodes in the block Merkle
tree also include the maximum global index they contain. Upon completion
of the second bisection search, we will have the transaction in which the
requested output resides. Performing the modified bisection algorithm one
more time on the transaction Merkle tree will yield the requested output,
given the server has built the authenticated data structure correctly in the
build phase. The server returns the output alongside the proof of correctness
in a JSON-encoded response to the client, which can verify the path taken
by the server against the top root it has stored.
Having a Merkle hash tree structure over the outputs and a modified bisec-
tion search means that the server can retrieve the output in O(logN) time.
Having multiple levels of Merkle trees in the server entails fast adjust times
in the top tree when blocks come in.
3.2.2 Generating Proofs at the Server
Whenever the server returns a requested output, it is also required to return
the steps it took in order to reach the output. After traversing down to the
found output, we call a function, which is shown in Figure 3.1, to traverse
back up to the root of the Merkle tree, collecting the digests of the node it
visits.
This process takes O(logN) time, as the server does a backwards traversal
from the output back up to the root, appending the hash of the sibling node
at each level. In our design, each node is designated as either the left sibling
or right sibling, which we denote as Left or Right, respectively. This is
essential to the client in verifying the proof. In our design, the function
traverses back up to the root of the transaction Merkle tree, then traverses
back up to the root of the block Merkle tree, and lastly it traverses back up
to the root of the top Merkle tree. At the end of each phase the proof for
each individual tree is stored in a vector, and given to the client as a 3-part
10
GETPROOF(index):
node← leaves[index]
proof ← []
proof.append((node, “SELF”))
while node.parent 6= NULL
sibling← node.sibling
proof.append((sibling, sibling.side))
node← node.parent
proof.append((node, “ROOT”))
return proof
Figure 3.1: The algorithm traverses from the output back up to the root,
adding the hash of the sibling of the current node to the proof.
proof.
3.2.3 Verifying Proofs
When a client receives a valid response to its query, it must first make sure
the server correctly fetched the output from its running node. The client
does this by checking the proof returned along with the response against the
Merkle root it has stored. The algorithm is shown in Figure 3.2.
CHECKPROOF(proof, root):
link← proof[0]
for i ← 1 to len(proof)
if proof[i].side = “LEFT”
link← hash(proof[i] + link)
else if proof[i].side = “RIGHT”
link← hash(link + proof[i])
else
return “Proof is invalid.”
if link 6= root
return “Proof is invalid.”
else
return “Proof is valid.”
Figure 3.2: The client completes this short proof by hashing the proof
elements together, and then checking against the stored root.
The client-side verifier goes through the three-step proof in O(logN) time,
invoking the verifier for checking a single Merkle tree each time. The single
Merkle tree verifier takes the initial value of the proof, and hashes the rest of
the values in the proof according to the side. Specifically, if the next value
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in the proof corresponds to the left sibling of the node in the Merkle tree, it
will concatenate the next value to the left of the current value, and hash the
concatenation. Otherwise, the verifier will concatenate the next value to the
right of the current value, and hash the concatenation. The single tree verifier
ends when the list is exhausted. The three individual proofs are linked such
that the result of the proof over the transaction Merkle tree is the starting
element of the proof over the block tree, and that the result of the proof over
the block tree is the starting element of the proof over the top Merkle tree.
This makes it difficult for a dishonest server to compromise the overall proof
as it would involve recomputing hashes over the whole blockchain. During
the verification process, if any of the steps fail, the client will mark the proof
as invalid, and consequently the server would be considered dishonest. At
the end of the proof, the client will perform a final check by determining if
the proof is equal to the top Merkle root it has stored. If the check passes,
then the client knows that the requested output was fetched correctly.
3.2.4 Updating the Merkle Tree
The current Monero block rate is about 2 minutes, which means that a new
block of transactions is appended to the ledger in that time. When a new
block is added, the server must be able to quickly parse information from it
and extend the ADS over the block. New transaction Merkle trees and the
block tree can quickly be built; however, the top Merkle tree would need to
extended. It will take too long to rebuild the top Merkle tree from scratch, as
the downtime will lead to clients being unable to send transactions. Instead,
we must have a method of adding to the top Merkle tree while adjusting only
the nodes affected.
The design of our Merkle tree1 uses a method for efficiently adding to an
existing tree structure. The algorithm, which is visualized in Figure 3.3 and
shown in Figure 3.4, is as follows:
1. In a given Merkle tree, return a list of nodes in the tree that have
complete subtrees beneath them, that is, the internal nodes that are
1Based on Jamie Steiner’s Merkle tree implementation (MIT license): https://
github.com/jvsteiner/merkletree
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roots of complete subtrees. This nodes in the list are ordered from left
to right.
2. In a reverse iteration of the list, compute a new parent node from the
list element and the node to be added. The node added will receive a
reference of Right from the new parent node, and the list element will
receive a reference of Left. The new parent node is now designated
as the new node to be added, and we repeat this as we iterate through
the list.
3. At the end of the iteration, the new parent node is effectively the new
Merkle root of the data structure. We return the node as such.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.3: In (a), the red section is a complete subtree and node n also has
a complete subtree underneath (empty tree). We wish to add node p. In
(b), p has been added, and the green and top nodes recomputed according
to our design.
ADDADJUST(complete-subtrees,new-node):
right-child← new-node
for left-child in reversed(complete-subtrees)
parent← NEWTREE(left-child, right-child)
right-child← parent
return parent
Figure 3.4: The function NewTree is the same as building a Merkle hash
tree over the two nodes passed in; it will return the Merkle root
When a the server receives the new block, it will first compute the trans-
action Merkle trees in the block, and then build the block Merkle tree. Next,
the server will add the new block as an additional leaf in the top Merkle tree
by using the add_adjust function. This is much faster than rebuilding the
whole tree from scratch.
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3.2.5 Conflict Resolution
The thin client would be communicating with multiple servers running a full
Monero node with our design on top of the blockchain. The client would
store the top Merkle roots of the servers in a list or similar data structure,
and update the roots when the server adds new blocks to the network. If
there is at least one honest server in the group of servers the thin client is
communicating with, the client can eventually distinguish that server from
the dishonest ones using the resolution protocol.
The conflict resolution protocol consists of the following three parties:
• the two servers that are in disagreement on their computation over the
Monero blockchain, and
• the client who discovers that the two servers are in disagreement based
on the Merkle roots it has stored.
The two servers do not have to be aware of each other in the network for
the conflict resolution protocol to be successful, nor do we need to assume
that they are not colluding. However, the client needs to be communicating
with at least one honest server in order to realize there is conflict. It keeps
track of the computation histories of each server by storing its top Merkle
root, which is periodically updated as new blocks come in. Servers that are in
agreement with each other would produce identical top Merkle roots, whereas
those in disagreement would produce vastly different roots due to uniformity.
When the client initiates the conflict resolution protocol, the servers need
not be notified that the protocol has started. The client can carry out the
protocol by making requests to each server. The algorithm is as follows:
1. The client queries each server for the number of leaves present at its top
Merkle structure. If the numbers match, the protocol proceeds. Oth-
erwise, the client can query several block explorers, which are running
Monero nodes, to check the current height. The server that is not at
the current height of the blockchain is determined to be lagging behind
the network and automatically marked as dishonest.
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2. The client sends a challenge to the servers. Specifically, each server is
asked to fetch the left and right child hashes of its top Merkle root.
If any of the children nodes are leaf nodes, then we also return the
pre-hashed data. Any server that fails to respond in bounded time is
marked as dishonest.
3. Upon receiving the requested left and right children, the client checks
the left child of the first server against that of the second. If they
match, then the client will add an additional command Right to the
/getchildren requests. Otherwise, it will add an additional command
Left to the requests.
4. At the server side, additional commands will result in the server first
traversing downward from the Merkle root in the corresponding direc-
tion, and then fetching the children at the resulting internal node. If
the commands make the traversal go out of bounds, then the response
will include a failure message.
5. Steps 2-4 are repeated until the client receives the leaf node at which
the servers initially disagree. This leaf node corresponds to the block
in which in conflict arises, and the protocol starts from step 1 again to
find the transaction in which the conflict arises.
6. Upon reaching the transaction in which the two servers disagree, the
client checks for the number of leaves, which correspond to outputs, in
the transaction. If the number of leaves is the same, then the client will
ask each server to respond with all of the outputs in that transaction.
The client can verify the outputs of a transaction by querying several
block explorers for the outputs indexed at a given transaction hash.
Because the number of outputs returned is small compared to the set
of all outputs, the client can quickly check the result against the servers’
responses. The server that contains the modified output is marked as
dishonest.
7. If the number of leaves is not the same, then all the client has to do is
call upon the block explorers to return the number of outputs indexed at
that given transaction. The server that produced the incorrect number
of leaves is marked as dishonest.
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(a) Server 1’s tree (b) Server 2’s tree
Figure 3.5: The conflict resolution protocol starts from the root of each
server’s top Merkle tree, and reaches the origin of conflict when the client
finds the leaf in which both servers disagree.
RESOLVECONFLICT(server1, server2):
if NUMLEAVES(server1) = NUMLEAVES(server2)
path← []
while(TRUE)
left1, right1← GETCHILDREN(server1, path)
left2, right2← GETCHILDREN(server2, path)
if left1 = left2
path.append(“RIGHT”)
else
path.append(“LEFT”)
if left1.isleaf or right1.isleaf
break
if left1 = left2
return right1, right2
else
return left1, left2
Figure 3.6: The client runs the conflict resolution protocol by making calls
to the servers in conflict.
In this design, which is visualized in Figure 3.5 and shown in Figure 3.6,
we want to find the earliest point in the Merkle tree that caused the two
servers to disagree. Because the servers have the same of number of leaves
in their top Merkle tree, they must have computed over the same number
of Monero blocks. This also implies that their trees were built in the same
manner and so we can traverse them with the same path.
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3.3 Data Structure Details
Our design for the authenticated data structure over the Monero blockchain
is as follows:
1. For a transaction with N outputs, we will build a Merkle tree over the
outputs o1, ..., oN . The Merkle root returned will be a digest of all the
outputs, as well as the maximum index of the outputs. Let us denote
the Merkle root returned as (tr, max(idx(o1, ..., oN))), where tr is the
digest of all the outputs in the transaction. Since outputs are ordered,
we can be sure that output oN will have the maximum global index.
2. From the first step, each block will have a set of Merkle roots corre-
sponding to the set of transactions in that block. Let us denote the
ordered list of Merkle roots as [(tr1, idx(tr1)),...,(trN , idx(trN))]. We
will build a Merkle tree over this list in the same way as the first step.
The Merkle root returned will be a digest of all the transactions in the
block, as well as the maximum index of the outputs. We denote this as
(br,max(idx(tr1, ..., trN))). Since transactions are ordered, we can be
sure that trN will have the maximum global index.
3. From the second step, there will now be a set of Merkle roots corre-
sponding to the blocks in the network. More specifically, each block in
the Monero blockchain will have a Merkle root associated with it. We
will build a Merkle tree over the roots of the blocks, and end up with
a top Merkle root. We denote this root as (top,max(idx(b1, ..., bN)),
where bi is the i
th block in the blockchain. Because the blocks are in
temporal order, we can be sure that bN will have the maximum global
index over all the outputs in the blockchain. The building phase con-
cludes after this step.
A detailed diagram of the three-layer Merkle tree can found found in Figure
3.7. In this design, the top root contains the digest of all the outputs in the
Monero blockchain and also the maximum global index of the outputs. The
top root can be stored at a client, which now does not need to download the
blockchain. It is evident that the top root would need to be updated and
pushed out to the client as new blocks come in. The design of our Merkle
tree supports adding to the tree without rebuilding the whole top structure.
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(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 3.7: The tree over the outputs (a) is constructed first. The root of
(a) is used as the leaf in (b), whose root is subsequently used as the leaf for
(c).
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CHAPTER 4
SECURITY ANALYSIS
4.1 Security Properties
Because hash functions are thought to be one-way functions, it is computa-
tionally impossible for a server to deceive a client by providing an incorrect
output while giving its proof that leads up to the correct Merkle root. The re-
quest would time out, and the thin client would mark the server as dishonest.
By using a Merkle tree over the blockchain, the client can also narrow down
the source of conflict between servers using a binary search on the hashes of
the internal nodes. This greatly reduces the time a client would have to take
to find errors.
4.2 Incentives
Unlike Ethereum, which supports smart contracts [12], Monero currently
cannot provide incentives that preserve its privacy goals. If we employed a
“verification game” dispute resolution layer identical to that in TrueBit, the
role of judges could be played by the miners in the network. In order to
get judges to referee the verification components of the conflict resolution
protocol correctly, rewards can be sent to them if the protocol successfully
terminates. At the start of a resolution, the client and two servers will be
mandated to deposit funds into escrow. At the end of the process, the funds
are returned to the honest server in full, whereas the dishonest server is
charged a fraction as penalty and the client is charged a service fee. If both
servers are found to be dishonest, then both are penalized and the service
fee on the client is discounted. A bad client call on two servers that are not
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in conflict will result in a higher service fee on the client and no deduction
on the servers. The refusal of the client or any server to participate in the
protocol will result in termination of the protocol and the designation as
dishonest in the case of the server. Having a reward gives an incentive to
the judges to lend their computing power and cooperation to the client. We
assume that the judges in the protocol referee each step fairly.
However, having a client pay miners in the network to referee would vio-
late the untraceability aspect of Monero’s privacy, as the identity of the client
would be exposed in the transaction. Also, because there are no smart con-
tracts in Monero, it is currently impossible for financial penalties or rewards
to be handed out.
4.3 Errors
As seen in the explanation of our protocol, there can be two causes for an er-
roneous transaction Merkle root. First, the server could have included extra
outputs from other transactions or excluded transaction outputs during the
building phase. Having the incorrect number of outputs guarantees a differ-
ent Merkle root from one built over the correct number of outputs. Second,
the data of the outputs could have been modified by the server. Even if the
server correctly builds the Merkle tree over the correct number of outputs,
the Merkle root would be different. A combination of these two errors can
also occur and result in an erroneous root.
A server can have reasons other than unintentional mistakes to deceive
the client. By receiving false information about the Monero blockchain, the
client can potentially create invalid transactions. Although those broad-
casted transactions would never receive any confirmation, the client would
be rendered unable to send funds in Monero. This would usually be done by
a disgruntled server.
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4.3.1 Handling Uncooperative Participants
In order to resolve conflicts in a timely manner, the conflict resolution proto-
col must be able to determine when a participant has become uncooperative
and ignore it. When the client asks the two conflicting servers to provide
their left and right children hashes of a requested Merkle root, the responses
must not only be valid, but also returned in a bound time. Whenever a
server fails to provide a valid response to a query for the children of a root
in that frame, the client will denote the server as being uncooperative and
consequently dishonest. Further penalties can be imposed on the dishonest
server if needed, including expulsion from the Monero peer-to-peer network.
In another scenario, the client can be the malicious participant in the pro-
tocol. By repeatedly sending requests, the client can overload the server and
prevent other clients from sending transactions. Because finding the con-
flicting leaf in a balanced binary tree should take no more than logN steps,
the number of requests for a tree’s children at a server can be limited within
a timeframe. If a client exceeds that limit for /getchildren requests, the
server can prevent the client from making further requests until a period of
time elapses. Because the conflict resolution process utilizes the computing
power of the servers, the client should also be punished if it calls the pro-
tocol on two servers that do not have conflicting Merkle roots. A check is
already implemented on the client side so as to prevent accidental calls from
the script, however, should the client circumvent this check, the servers can
terminate the protocol and impose penalties on the client, including denial
of service. This would force the client to utilize another server to fulfill its
requests. If all of the servers available to the client deny service, then the
malicious client would be starved.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLEMENTATION AND BENCHMARKS
Our implementation of this design is done in Python. All blockchain data
was scraped using a C++ scraper we developed over the Monero blockchain,
collecting the following information for each RingCT output:
(block hash, transaction hash, output public key, global index)
All the raw data from the blockchain is written to a database, which we
then read out of using the sqlite3 module for Python. The database con-
tains 2985559 RingCT outputs, which range from the launch of RingCT to
November 5, 2017. We make an arbitrary split on October 23, 2017, and
use the data from January 10, 2017, to the split date to build our initial
authenticate data structure. The data from October 23, 2017, to November
5, 2017, is used to test efficient adding to the already-present ADS.
All of the Merkle trees created in our design are too large to fit into main
memory, and so we utilize a disk-backed persistent dictionary-like object to
store the data structures. The reason for using this over “dbm” databases is
that the values shelved can be arbitrary Python classes, which is not allowed
in conventional databases.
5.1 Benchmarks
Our design is deployed on three separate LinuxONE medium virtual servers
running a SLES12 SP2 image. There are two virtual CPUs and 4096MB
RAM on each server. Two servers are deployed as full node servers, which
contain the Monero blockchain, and the other is deployed as a client.
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In order to profile the performance of our design, a script is set up at each
server to automatically carry out and measure the actions pertinent to each
test. For the build test, each full node server built the three-layer Merkle tree
from the scraped blockchain data, tore down the design, and repeated the
build phase. In the query test, the client generated a random global index and
queried each server for the output located at that index. Evaluation of the
query test also includes the time to generate the proof at the server side, as
well as network delays. The proof verification test was simultaneously carried
out as the client checked the correctness of the query. In the add and adjust
test, each server added a new block to the ADS and adjusted its top Merkle
tree. The updated top root of each server was also checked for correctness. In
the conflict resolution test, one server modified a random transaction before
building over the blockchain. The client would then initiate the conflict
resolution protocol and find the tampered transaction. The results of the
tests are shown in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1.
Table 5.1: Combined performance results
Average Performance Number of Trials
Build 4886.182153 seconds 100
Query response 0.714903 seconds 1000
Proof verification 0.000132 seconds 1000
Update top tree 13.320195 seconds 100
Conflict resolution 236.235168 seconds 100
5.1.1 Disk Latency
A detailed profile on the conflict resolution protocol reveals that a majority
of the time was spent by the server retrieving the requested Merkle tree
from its disk-backed dictionary-like object and traversing it based on the
client’s request. A way to mitigate this would be to use a server with more
available RAM so that all of the trees would fit in main memory, removing
the need for disk seeks. Another method for greatly improving the speed
of the protocol would be to memoize the /getchildren calls. Because the
client sends traversal commands that are extended from the call before, the
server should not have to re-traverse the path from the root, instead picking
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Figure 5.1: Memory usage at the server during the build phase.
up from where it last ended.
5.1.2 Storage
Scraping all of the necessary data for our design from the Monero blockchain
into a database takes 1.57 GB of disk space. The storage of all the Merkle
trees in our design takes 2.17 GB. For comparison, the current size of the
Monero blockchain is 33.52 GB (as of November 29, 2017).
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This study serves as a proof-of-concept for a thin client to be built over the
Monero blockchain. By building a three-layer Merkle tree over all the blocks,
a server can efficiently fulfill queries on the blockchain from a client while
proving it has provided the correct response. A thin client can securely get
outputs to be used and generate transactions without having to store and run
a full copy of the ledger. In the event of a conflict, the client can quickly per-
form a resolution by sending challenges to each server and narrowing down
to the source of conflict. The server also has the capability to ensure that
the conflict resolution does not drain its resources by blocking out extraneous
calls.
Further study will require extensive testing and more data from the Monero
blockchain to be built over. The Merkle tree used now should also be updated
to orphan blocks An implementation will only be useful if the changes are
made to the Monero protocol, including adding a Merkle root to each block
and adding privacy preserving incentives. As more people turn to cryptocur-
rencies, we expect the innovations stemming from building authenticated
data structures over blockchains to grow.
The repository used in this study is publicly available at: https://github.
com/kvnl33/merkletree
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